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iii Flexibility dictates that the commander's LCOP must account for the impact of time, space and force on both combat and combat service support (CSS) units. As an operation progresses, the factors of time, space and force will continually change for both combat and CSS units; however, the CSS commander must remain responsive, flexible, and anticipate requirements for both his units and that of supported units as well. In fact, JP 4-0 lists seven principles of logistics: responsiveness, simplicity, economy, sustainability, flexibility, survivability and attainability, 15 but to adhere to these principles, the commander must have During OIF, CENTCOM was simultaneously engaged in mobilization, deployment, reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI), sustaining ongoing combat operations, and planning for future operations. Since all of these activities were linked to the same logistics system, they all had to be integrated into a single logistics COP. Taking all of these possibilities into account, LCOP helped the commander balance the factor of time with space and force by providing timely and relevant answers to the following and other pertinent questions:
• When does the commander need to make critical logistics decisions in order to maintain flexible use of available forces and space?
• After making a decision about force and space, how long will it take for that decision to be realized? (Mobilization, preparation for attack, deployment, etc.)
• How long can a given size force operate in a given area without resupply?
The first bullet indicates that LCOP alerted the commander of impending critical decisions in enough time that he could reasonably react. For example, it would have done GEN Franks little good to have been informed that his attack would culminate due to a lack of fuel and ammo after he had already committed 3ID in the attack on Baghdad. The fact is that he was well aware of 3ID's logistics status and because of LCOP he was able to continue the attack until 3ID was reduced to less than one day of supplies. Further analysis of the march to Baghdad in terms of the factor of space highlights relative success of LCOP during OIF. For example, LCOP had to consider the physical state of the infrastructure on logistics support. When the battlespace changed during the course of the attack due to weather and obstacles, the commander was able to quickly assess the impact on his timeline, forces, and operational functions. Furthermore, the enemy influenced the space by retreating into towns and occupying sensitive sites, such as schools, and hospitals.
LCOP helped the commander balance the factor of space with force and time by providing pertinent answers to the following and other relevant questions:
• How do physical attributes of the battlespace affect the logistics support to the mission in terms of time and force?
• demonstrates the need for LCOP to project space requirements for logistics into the future.
As the attack developed, LCOP informed the commander of the changing space requirements and how space could affect the time for resupply and how it affected supported forces.
Of the three operational factors, the factor of force is the most complex and dynamic; therefore, it posed the greatest challenge to developing and maintaining logistics situational awareness (LCOP). For the most part, physical attributes of time, space and force can be measured or computed, but the force factor also encompasses the "human elements", such as doctrine, morale, leadership, discipline and training, which are almost impossible to quantify. 26 For example, a unit with an aggressive leader might consume more supplies and move faster than a unit that has a less aggressive leader. A well trained and disciplined unit might be more judicious and efficient with ammo and fuel. Whereas a poorly trained and undisciplined unit might be wasteful and disorganized. Additionally, combined arms, joint and multinational operations are variables that can affect logistics in unexpected ways.
Finally, interaction with an intelligent, thinking and adaptive enemy adds even more uncertainty to the situation. Clausewitz states, "Moral values cannot be ignored in war" 27 , and they are almost impossible to predict or quantify in a way that is useful to developing situational awareness.
Nonetheless, this was not a reason to give up on developing and maintaining a LCOP.
In fact, it made having LCOP even more urgent. The "human intercourse" 28 in war will always bring about unexpected results, but because LCOP helped the commander minimize risk from predictable sources, and helped him make intelligent guesses about unquantifiable influences, he was in a better position to exploit success when the opportunity presented itself. Considering both intangible and physical attributes, LCOP helped the commander balance the factor of force with space and time by providing accurate and reliable answers to the following and other questions:
• What size and type of force can I deploy into the battlespace and when can it get there to start operations?
• Do I have adequate logistics capability at the right place and time to support forces involved in ongoing and future combat operations, if not, when and where will I have it?
• What time and space limitations does logistics place upon my options for employing forces to support ongoing, future, branch and sequel operations?
27 Howard and Parret, 137. 28 Ibid, 149.
The first question was answered primarily through the application of doctrine, science and mathematics, but sometimes it was complicated by changing force, time and space issues.
For example, a deployment might have only taken a week for a combat ready unit in the United States, but a month for a similar unit that was closer to the area of interest, but was less combat ready and relied upon foreign ports. The second question is far more complicated. First of all, how much was enough and second, where was the right place and what was the right time? To answer these questions, the logisticians had to have an ability to predict supply consumptions to determine what, where and when supplies would be needed.
Furthermore, they had to also synchronize logistics with the other operational functions to determine the best location and time to provide support. The last question is as complicated as the first two combined. To answer this question, the logisticians had to consider the logistics impact of ongoing and planned operations and then predict how the outcomes of either or both would impact potential branches and sequels. It was virtually impossible to answer this question with confidence, but getting it wrong could have resulted in disastrous consequences.
It is apparent from after action reviews and GAO reports, that the LCOP concept did not address all of lessons from Desert Storm. However, there is little doubt that it was a definite improvement in terms of the agility, flexibility and speed at which it allowed commanders to make and execute operational level decisions. Furthermore, LCOP was not fully implemented across the battlefield and each service had its own technical and conceptual implementation. Nonetheless, it was a move in the right direction.
Forget logistics and you lose. 29 Gen Freddie Franks, 1991
29 Pagonis and Krause, 14. 5. Synchronizing LCOP with Operational Functions.
Whether he uses 3x5 cards as LTG Pagonis did during Desert Storm, 30 or a satellite enabled in-transit visibility system that was used during OIF, 31 the commander seeks to synchronize the battlefield operating functions, so that he can achieve and maintain the proper balance between time, space and force. Specifically, he wants to leverage LCOP to synchronize logistics with maneuver, intelligence, C2, fires, and protection to effectively deliver combat power at the right place and at the right time. LCOP only paints one part of the overall picture, but logistics is the function that "underwrites" 32 all other activities, so to understand the logistics picture is to understand what is physically possible. Consequently, LCOP should play a major role in helping the commander synchronize the other functions.
For example, in order to synchronize the C2 function with the other functions, the commander must allocate adequate CSS capability to enable the other functions to operate in accordance with the C2 structure. Unity of effort can only be achieved if all subordinate organizations have the logistics capability to follow the commander's orders. It would be detrimental to assign or attach additional forces to a subordinate commander and then not give him the logistics capability to sustain those forces in accordance with the mission and scheme of maneuver. This sounds very obvious and simple, but it is not uncommon for units to be given forces that they can not sustain, and without a determined effort to maintain logistics situational awareness, it would happen even more often.
30 Pagonis and Cruikshank, [106] [107] USJFCOM, OIF Lessons, 95. 32 Pagonis and Krause, 4 For example, consider a fictitious 33 Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) operation that called for switching the main effort from V Corps to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) following a successful V Corps attack on the Medina Division near Karbala. As the main effort, I MEF received an Army aviation battalion and two Army field artillery battalions under an attached command relationship. However, during the attack, the enemy fought harder than expected, so both V Corps and I MEF used more ammo and fuel than they anticipated and their organic supplies were dangerously low. Furthermore, the attack was so fast and pushed so deep into enemy territory that resupply from the corps support command (COSCOM) to I MEF was not be possible for at least 24-48 hours. To further complicate matters, massive sandstorms severely restricted resupply operations.
At this point, the CFLCC commander must decide whether to continue the attack and risk exceeding his culminating point or request an operational pause to allow time for his logistics forces to catch up. However, stopping the attack could give the enemy time to regroup and bring in reinforcements. Either choice could result in unnecessary lost of life, so the CFLCC commander should base his decision on the best information possible; however, if he had not been maintaining logistics situational awareness (LCOP) and synchronizing the operational functions, he would, in effect, be guessing. The fact that he got into this situation is an indication that the functions of maneuver, intelligence and logistics got out of synch, and caused the factors of time, space and force to go out of balance. To bring the attack back into balance, the CFLCC commander must now resynchronize the operational functions by trading space for time (stopping or slowing the attack) and using the time to gather better intelligence on the enemy and to move logistics and combat forces into the proper position to 33 This is meant to depict reasonable situation and not to draw a direct similarity to OIF operations. I chose this approach because I did not want to appear to criticize the OIF operation. Furthermore, this vignette is designed continue the attack. Even with LCOP and the best effort to synchronize the operational functions, the commander may not have prevented this situation, but at least he would have recognized the problem soon enough to be in position to do something about it.
This example shows that LCOP, when synchronized with the operating functions, can help the commander gain and maintain the proper balance between time, space and force. It also shows that LCOP can not completely eliminate the fog and friction of war and that LCOP does not generate combat power where none exists. This point really goes to the heart of any new technology or concept and it also applies to the U.S. military transformation efforts. It is not enough to have information superiority or to be networked; but rather, the commander must be able to act with decisive force, which can only be achieved through the proper balance of time, space and force. No matter what doctrine/concept is being employed, the logistician must continue to help the commander balance time, space and force. Under NCW, the battlespace will be larger and non-contiguous, and smaller lighter forces will move, fire, maneuver, communicate and decide faster than they ever have before. Larger non-contiguous battlespace will result in longer and more complex operational and strategic lines of communication (LOC) and a greater concern for security. A smaller lighter faster force will mean that combat units will carry less organic supplies and will have a limited stockpile capability, so resupply will be required more often, almost to the point of being an uninterrupted flow. Furthermore, NCW strives to leverage information technology to significantly speed up the commander's decision cycle. This ultimately will mean less time for logistician to help the commander synchronize the operational functions, less time to assess the impacts of time, space, and force on ongoing and future operations, and most importantly, less time to physically deliver logistics support to ongoing and future operations.
Realizing that these challenges could not be met with the current military logistics capability, OFT initiated the Sense and Respond Logistics Concept (SRLC) study. SRLC envisions having sensors on equipment that automatically sense a requirement and notify the appropriate "agent(s)" who automatically forward the requirement to appropriate decision maker(s), who then decide how and when to respond. If successfully implemented, SRLC will give the logisticians near real-time total visibility over requirements; however, the challenge for the logistician is not only asset visibility, but rather, helping the commander balance time, space and force so that he is in a position to act decisively. For example, as ground forces marched to Baghdad during OIF, every logistician in theater knew (without the aid of sensors) that the lead elements needed food, water, ammo and fuel to continue the attack, but none were in a position to do anything about it. It will be of little use for the operational level commander to get automated messages telling him that his units need supplies, when he has no time to respond because he is too far away and the enemy is blocking the LOC. If successful, SRLC will provide value on the battlefield, but it will not alleviate the need for the operational level logisticians to help the commander balance time, space and force via LCOP. In fact, it will increase the need for LCOP to sort out SRLC data.
Another fundamental transformation concept is effects based operations (EBO), which strives to achieve the desired effects through network centric operations without having to necessarily destroy the enemy. The U.S. Air Force heavily favors this concept, but in fact, all of the services practice EBO. EBO complicates life for the logistician because it does not provide a clear vision of how the next war will be fought. The vision of the next war is essential to logistics planning between wars because it provides the basis for doctrine, which drives logistics planning assumptions and support strategies.
EBO provides political leaders with maximum flexibility by offering them a wide range of options for achieving the desired effects, but more options mean that logistics planning become more diffused and complicated, especially for ground forces. Whether a B-2 is dropping a bomb in Afghanistan or Iraqi, the Air Force logistics and targeting processes remain basically the same. Likewise, the Navy's carrier battle groups operate with similar autonomy. However, the Army and the Marines are significantly affected by time, space, force issues related to the nuances of different EBO options. For example, the desired effect in OIF was regime change, which could have been achieved through a decapitation attack on Saddam and Bath leadership, or as it were, through the destruction of the Iraqi Republican
Guard and the occupation of Iraq. In both cases, the Air Force and Navy logistics and targeting processes remain basically be the same; however, for the Army and Marines these two options required drastically different logistics support plans. Flexible planning to support EBO significantly increases the requirement for LCOP during all phases of conflict.
In order to address this challenge, the Marines have standardized modular capability based force packages called Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and the Army is in the process of doing something similar with its "Unit of Employment" and "Unit of Action"
concept. 34 However, modular force packages only address the force factor and makes assumptions about space and time, which may or may not be valid. For example, during OIF I MEF traveled much farther inland and operated much longer than their planning assumptions allowed for and this immediately led to logistics challenges that had to be overcome. 35 Modular force packages provide a template that planners can quickly modify and tailor almost on the fly, but to do this, commanders must have logistics situational awareness (LCOP) to help them quickly assess the impacts on time, space and force.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For transformation to be successful the US Military must get the logistics function right the first time and getting it right means building a proper LCOP. The logistics process starts well before war is initiated and continues after the last shot is fired; therefore, building a LCOP must follow this same paradigm. LCOP must be a continuum that is embedded in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, material, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF) and evolves from one conflict to the next. • Recommendation #1: Joint and Service doctrine should be modified to provide guidance for the development and maintenance of LCOP during peacetime and in war. Doctrine provides the common basis for implementing and interpreting the LCOP.
• Recommendation #2: DoD and Service logistics organizations should be modified to facilitate the development and maintenance of LCOP during peacetime and in war. The modified Organizational structure should alleviate stovepipes and institutionalize LCOP.
• Recommendation #3: Joint and Component operational level training must better integrate the logistics function. Training is the greatest challenge to developing and maintaining a relevant LCOP. During training, commanders personalize their LCOP and they are exposed to logistics capabilities and limitations; therefore, it is imperative that more emphasis be placed upon integrating operational logistics into Joint training.
• Recommendation #4: Leadership development must refocus on operational art so that leaders at all levels understand how to leverage LCOP to balance time, space and force.
• Recommendation #5: LCOP related material solutions should focus on enhancing the commander's ability to synchronize the operating functions and balance time, space and force. Furthermore, requirements should be written in manner that keeps the material developer focused on enhancing operational art, not merely new technical capabilities.
